COMMENTS
An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates
in Civil Cases
In order to relieve part of the work load of federal district courts,
Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968,1 creating a new
class of federal judicial officers to replace the existing system of
masters and commissioners. Because masters and commissioners normally served only temporarily or part time and because of the manner
in which they were compensated, Congress was reluctant to invest
either office with new substantive powers. Masters were paid a "reasonable fee" for services rendered, a practice that encouraged the master
to deliberately create unnecessary work in order to increase his fee.2
Commissioners were often paid by the piece-for example, receiving
3
compensation if they issued an arrest warrant but not if they refused.
In addition, many masters and commissioners were practicing members
of the bar, raising problems of possible conflicts of interest and often
resulting in serious delays, since many officers gave their private practice
precedence over their judicial duties. 4 To eliminate these problems, the
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (1970).
2 This problem long plagued the master system. See 6 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAAT 43
(J.Bowring ed. 1843); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A IhISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 441-42 (4th ed.
1927). It was dealt with in part by giving trial courts wide discretion in setting fee awards
and by appellate review of those awards. Cf. Newton v. Consolidated Gas, 259 U.S.
101 (1922). Nevertheless, recent objections to reference as involving unreasonable
expense seem predicated in part on the abuses to which the "reasonable fee" system is
prone, cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Adventures in Good Eating
v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942).
8 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 916. Although there is uncertainty as to
whether the statute in fact made payment contingent upon issuance of a warrant, most
commissioners believed that it did. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
468, 474 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
4 For a discussion of delay problems, see A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL AD"INISTRATION 1240-41 (1952); Kaufman, Masters in

the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUmn. L. REv. 452 (1958). See also La Buy v. Howes

Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir.
1951); Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir, 1942).
The Act deals with this problem by providing that a full time magistrate may not practice
law, 28 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1970), and by generally providing that no magistrate may engage in
any business inconsistent with the proper performance of his judicial duties, id. §§ 632(a),
(b). In reference to the conflicts of interest problem, see United States v. O'Connor, 291
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1968 Act gave to magistrates fixed terms of office at fixed salaries. 5
By these provisions, Congress attempted to attract competent, highly
qualified persons to the new positions6 and thus to justify allowing
masters to exercise powers more extensive than those previously allowed
7
commissioners and masters.
In the 1968 Act, Congress vested magistrates with jurisdiction over
petty criminal offenses8 and, prior to the Act's passage, Congress's attention seems to have focused largely on this new grant of power.9
Nonetheless, the Act makes clear that Congress had another purposeto enable magistrates to relieve district courts of some part of their civil,
as well as their criminal, work load. 10 Magistrates' duties explicitly include, but are not limited to, service as special masters pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, assistance to district judges in
pretrial and discovery proceedings in both civil and criminal actions,
and preliminary review of habeas corpus petitions." More importantly
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Volland, 69 F-2d 475 (7th Cir. 1934); Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 5-9, 277-78; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
5 The Act explicitly expresses a preference for full time magistrates, 28 U.S.C. § 633(a)
(3) (1970), who are to be appointed for a term of eight years, id. § 631(e), with a fixed
salary not to exceed 75 percent of the salary of a district court judge, id. § 634(a). This
salary may not be reduced during the magistrate's term in office, id. § 634(b). Part time
magistrates are appointed for a term of four years, id. § 634(a). Neither full time nor
part time magistrates may be removed from office except for "incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability" as found by a majority of the judges
of the district, id. 631(h).
6 For example, between 20 percent and 80 percent of commissioners were not even
lawyers. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 164, 461. The fact that a single judge could
appoint masters and commissioners also gave rise to fears of patronage and nepotism.
Cf. id. at 164. The Magistrates Act requires a magistrate to be appointed by a majority of
the judges of the district. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) disqualifies any person related by blood or
marriage to a judge of the appointing court, id. § 631(b)(4), and requires the
magistrate to be a qualified member of the bar of the highest court in the state in which
he is to serve unless both the appointing court and the Judicial Conference find that
no qualified member of the bar is available, id. § 631(b).
7 See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 9-17; Hearings before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 549 et al., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-67 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as House Hearings]. Control of discovery and pre-trial hearings was the original concept
of the usefulness of the federal magistrate in civil hearings. See Senate Hearings,supra note
3, at 23, 239; Kaufman, supra note 4. Questions have been raised about the actual economizing effects of the use of magistrates in pre-trial hearings. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen,
460 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957). This comment, however, proposes use of the magistrate to hear
the entire cause and is, therefore, not affected by such considerations. The district courts
would be left free to use the magistrates in whatever pre-trial roles seem best under the
circumstances of the particular cases.
8 28 U.S.C. 636(a) (1970).
9 Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 4-9; House Hearings, supra note 7, at 60-67.
10 28 U.S.C. 636(b) (1970); see Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 11; House Hearings,
supra note 7, at 66-67, 157.
11 28 U.S.C. 636(b) (1970).
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perhaps, the Act provides that a majority of judges in each district may,
by rule, assign to magistrates "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."' 2
The Magistrates Act thus offers a means of alleviating, in some measure, the pressures and delays that overcrowded dockets now impose
on the district courts. In particular, the district courts may, under the
Act, allow magistrates to make final decisions in civil cases, subject only
to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review by the district court. In
a number of recent cases, however, the courts have expressed either
grave doubts about or direct disapproval of the exercise by magistrates
of adjudicative powers in civil cases.' 3 These opinions have equated the
civil adjudicative powers of magistrates with those of masters acting
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 53,14 which restricts references
to masters, except in matters of account, to cases in which "some exceptional condition requires it."' 5 Since the master's conclusions of law are
given no weight,' 6 use of a master produces piecemeal litigation-one
adjudicator for fact, another for law.
This comment argues that these restrictions on magistrates' powers
are not constitutionally required. Rather, they are based on a longstanding reaction to the possibilities of abuse in the former system of
masters and the consequent recognition that reference to masters was
normally undesirable. The Magistrates Act, however, was intended to
eliminate these possibilities of abuse. There is long-standing precedent
for reference, when both parties have consented, of entire civil cases
for decision as to both law and fact. A policy encouraging consensual
reference under the new magistrate system is both permissible and
desirable as a means of reducing congestion in the district courts. Use
of the proposed adjudicative powers of federal magistrates would provide a needed middle ground between arbitration and full trial in the
district court.
Id.
See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972); Devcon Corp. v. Woodhill
Chemical Sales Corp., 455 F.2d 830 (Ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972);
Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d 207 (lst Cir. 1972). See also Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Henderson v. Brierly, 468 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1972);
Givens v. W. T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 56 (1972).
14 Direct reliance is placed in the principal case, TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
548, 360 (7th Cir. 1972), on the rules developed to deal with the problems of references
under the master system.
15 FED. R. Crv. P. 53(b).
16 Id. 53(e). Findings of fact are reviewed on a "dearly erroneous" standard in nonjury cases, id. 53(e)(2), and may be introduced as evidence in jury cases, id. 53(e)(3). The
only exception to these review standards occurs when the parties stipulate that the
master's findings of fact shall be final, in which case, "only questions of law arising upon
the report shall thereafter be considered." Id. 54(e)(4).
12
13
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I
McMillen,'7

In TPO, Inc. v.
the most comprehensive of the recent
opinions limiting the civil powers of magistrates, defendant's motion
for summary judgment had been referred to a magistrate. Plaintiffs
consented to the reference, but the defendants objected. Without
discussing the relevance of consent the Seventh Circuit stated broadly
that: "[M]agistrates have no power to decide motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment, both of which involve ultimate decision making ....[T]he order of reference here was lacking in power
and 'amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues
involved in the litigation.'"18 The TPO decision borrowed the "abdication of the judicial function" concept from a masters case, 19 thus
importing into the developing law of magistrates concepts and restrictions developed in reference to special masters. The court justified this
importation by reference to the statement in the Magistrates Act that
magistrates could act as special masters subject to the restrictions of
Rule 53.20

The leading case on Rule 53 is La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.21 The
district court, over the objections of both parties, had referred a complex antitrust case to a master. At the time of reference the judge had
already heard and decided requests for discovery and admissions and
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The court of appeals
granted mandamus vacating the order of reference; the Supreme Court
affirmed. As the Supreme Court noted, the judge's "knowledge of the
cases at the time of the references, together with his long experience in
the antitrust field, points to the conclusion that he could dispose of the
litigation with greater dispatch than anyone else." 22 The Court's decision did not rest, however, upon either the lack of consent or an
interest in judicial economy. Instead, the Court stated that references
amount "to little less than an abdication of the judicial function" and
that "the practice of making references 'does not commend itself' and
'...

should seldom be made, and if at all only when unusual circum-

stances exist.'

"23

460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
18 Id. at 359, quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957).
17

19 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
20 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1970).
21 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
22 Id. at 256.
23 Id. at 258, citing In re Irving-Austin Bldg. Corp., 100

1938).

F.2d 574, 577 (7th Cir.
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The principle of La Buy does not reach the new federal magistrates.
The Court's statements were instead a reaction against having cases
tried "before a temporary substitute appointed on an ad hoc basis and
ordinarily not experienced in judicial work." 24 The Court quoted at
length a statement by Chief Justice Vanderbilt that sums up the then
dominant attitudes about masters: "There is no more effective way of
putting a case to sleep for an indefinite period than to permit it to go
to a reference with a busy lawyer as a referee. Only a drastic administrative rule, rigidly enforced, strictly limiting the matters in which a
reference may be had . . . will put to rout this inveterate enemy of
dispatch in the trial of cases." 25 Since the problems of delay, ignorance,
and conflict of interest were present in all references at that time, a
logical solution was the blanket restriction on the use of masters.
This implementation of a policy decision against the use of masters
has been interpreted, however, as a policy decision against references
to any non-Article III tribunal and thus has come to be applied to
the magistrate system. The disapproval of masters even as a matter of
policy is, however, a relatively recent development. The prior common
law of references suggests uses of the magistrate system far beyond the
limited role it is presently accorded.
II
In the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court explicitly approved the use of masters in complex cases. 26 The Court also recognized
a distinction in the standard of review between cases in which the
parties had not consented to the reference and those cases in which
there was " a reference of the [entire] cause by consent." It was recognized that, when both parties have consented to reference, "[the] report
is to be considered as an award obligatory on all the parties, unless
set aside for some of those causes which are admitted to vitiate an
award." 27
24

Id. at 259.

25

Id. at 253 n.5.

26

See Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864); Heirs of P.F. Dubourg de St. Colombe

v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 624 (1833); cf. Thornton v. Carson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
596 (1818).
27 Field v. Holland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 8, 21 (1810). These cases did not treat the
seventh amendment problems of reference, but in United States v. Rathbone, 27 F. Cas.
711 (No. 16,121) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828), the circuit court in holding that a reference without
consent was violative of the seventh amendment, stated: "Admitting the court had no
power to order the cause referred, yet there can be no doubt this could be done by the
consent of the parties." Id. at 711. See also, Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 800 (1920);
Graffis v. Woodward, 96 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 805 U.S. 681 (1938). But cf. In
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The principal question during this period was not what cases might
be referred, but rather what the standard of review should be when
the master's report came before the trial court. This question was
directly presented in Kimberly v. Arms, 28 in which Justice Field set
out a rule of review based on consent to reference:
[The trial court] cannot, of its own motion, or upon the request
of one party, abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment
the controversy presented, and devolve that duty upon any of its
officers. But when the parties consent to the reference of a case
to a master or other officer to hear and decide all the issues therein,
and report his findings, both of fact and of law, and such reference
is entered as a rule of the court, the master is clothed with very
different powers from those which he exercises upon ordinary
references, without such consent; and his determinations are not
subject to be set aside and disregarded at the mere discretion of
the court.... [The master's] findings, like those of an independent
tribunal, are to be taken as presumptively correct, subject, indeed,
to be reviewed under the reservation contained in the consent and
order of the court, when there has been manifest error in the
consideration given to the evidence, or in the application of the
29
law, but not otherwise.
The Kimberly rule was approved in subsequent cases,8 0 but the Court
ignored the element of consent in several opinions that held that where
the trial court concurred in the master's findings, the findings were
"to be taken as presumptively correct, and unless some obvious error
has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious or important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, the
decree should be permitted to stand."3 1
The early Rules of Equity governing masters made no reference
to consent or to restrictions on the use of masters.32 In 1912, without
any clear indication of reasons, the Equity Rules on masters were
amended to state that "[s]ave in matters of account, a reference to a
master shall be the exception, not the rule, and shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."' 3 In Los
re Narragansett Pier Amusement Corp. 224 F.2d 231 (Ist Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 862 (1955); Vermeule v. Reilly, 196 F. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
28 129 U.S. 512 (1888).
29 Id. at 524.
30 E.g., Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631, 637 (1895).
31 Crawford v. Neal, 144 U.S. 585, 596 (1892). See also Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U.S. 132
(1892). These cases relied on a pre-Kimberly line of similar rulings, e.g., Tilghman v.
Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1887); Mdedsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U.S. 66 (1883).
32 Equity R. 75-83, 42 U.S. (1 How.) lxiv-lxvii (1842).
33 Equity R. 59, 226 U.S. 666 (1912).
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Angeles Brush Corp. v. Jones,34 the Supreme Court construed this
provision to forbid blanket referrals of patent cases. The construction
was justified not on constitutional grounds, but rather because it spared
patent litigants the expense of reference. The reference involved in
the case was held to be justified because calendar congestion was preventing consideration of criminal cases by the trial courts. The language
used, however, indicated that the limitation of reference to "exceptional
circumstances" was to be strictly construed.3 5 In spite of the "exceptional circumstances" rule, the Kimberly concept of the effect of consent
continued to be relevant to the standard of review of a master's report.3 6
The first serious reduction in the weight given the master's report
came in Ex Parte Peterson,3 7 in which the Court approved the use of
an auditor to define the issues before a jury trial. The Court's dicta
implied, however, that an auditor's report could in no case be more
than prima facie evidence, a means of defining the issues and shifting
the burdens of persuasion. Later interpretations of Peterson have focused on this dicta, ignoring the fact that the auditor in that case was
38
appointed without consent of the defendant.
The 1932 revision of the Equity Rules discarded the Kimberly consent rule. Rule 61- provided that in all references, whether compulsory
or "by consent of parties where consent is necessary," all findings of
law and fact were to be subject to the same standard of review; they
were to be treated as presumptively correct, subject to reversal if the
court "is fully satisfied that error has been committed."39 As pointed
out in Roosevelt v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co.,40 the new rule

meant that the parties could no longer consent, as they had in Kimberly,
to review on a "substantial evidence" standard. The new rule continued
to allow the parties to consent to review by the same standard governing
review of arbitrators' decisions; 41 but since arbitrators' decisions are
34 272 U.S. 701 (1927).

35 This was a blanket reduction in the number of cases that could be referred, and as
such it was taken to apply without reference to consent of the parties.

36 See Connor v. United States, 214 F. 522 (9th Cir. 1914); cf. Denver v. Denver Union
Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918), where the Court, in holding that the report of a master
on a consensual reference was advisory only, relied on the fact that the consent agreement and the order of reference provided that the master was to report his findings of
fact and of law "for the advisement of the court." Id. at 180-81. The Court thus implicitly reaffirmed the principle of Kimberley that consent could determine the standard of
review.
37 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
38 E.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 252 U.S. 249, 256 (1957).
39 Equity R. 61j, 286 U.S. 571 (1932).
40 70 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1934). See also Lone Star Gas Co. v. Forth Worth, 93 F.2d 584

(5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938).
41 Equity R. 61J, 286 U.S. 571 (1932).
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essentially unreviewable, 42 this provision simply left the parties with a
choice between no review and a mere presumption of correctness. The
rules also continued to require that reference could be had only "in
exceptional circumstances.

'43

Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938,
consolidated the previous Equity Rules on masters. The new rule
stated that "[t]he effect of a master's report is the same whether or not
the parties have consented to the reference; but, when the parties
stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions
of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered."4 4 In
nonjury cases, where the parties did not stipulate finality for findings
45
of fact, they were to be reviewed on a "clearly erroneous" standard;
in jury cases the findings were to be introducible as evidence. 46 No
provision was made for giving weight to the master's findings of law.
The comments to the new rule made no mention of the restriction
of the report to findings of fact, erroneously stating that the rule was
substantially identical to the old Equity Rules. 47 With the elimination,
however, of the master's power to make findings of law, parties seeking
an adjudication of their dispute in a single proceeding were faced with
a choice between consent to an independent arbitrator, who would not
use court procedures and whose decision would be for all practical
purposes unreviewable in court, and a full scale trial in the district
court. It had thus become clearly impossible to consent to a full adjudication in an adjunct of the district court where issues of law and
fact could be determined under court procedures and any serious defects in the result could be appealed.
The present Rule 53 is substantially the same as that adopted in
1938, but the intervening years have seen increasing disapproval of the
practice of reference. The Seventh Cicuit, for example, in Adventures
in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, Inc.,48 denounced reference because masters "are expensive and time-consuming. The delay in some
instances is unbelievably long. Likewise, the increase in cost is heavy.
For nearly a century, litigants and members of the bar have been crying
against this avoidable burden of costs and this inexcusable delay." 49
42 See text and notes at notes 53-63 infra.

43 Equity R. 59, 226 U.S. 666 (1912), was left unchanged by the 1932 revisions.
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4), 808 U.S. 731 (1939).
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2), 308 U.S. 750-31 (1939).
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3), 308 U.S. 731 (1939).
47
48
49

5A J.MooRE,

FEDERAL PRAcarcE 53.01 [6] (2d ed. 1971).
131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942).
Id. at 814. Similarly, United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1951),

interpreting Admiralty Rule 43 as equivalent to Rule 53, disapproved reference to an
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In 1957 the Supreme Court stated its serious disapproval of the
master system in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,5 o discussed above, using
the "abdication of the judicial function" language to express the policy
disapproval of the shortcomings of the master system.
III
The Magistrates Act eliminated the problems that had given rise
to the policy against references.5 1 As the opinion in TPO demonstrates, however, courts continue to view reference as "an abdication
of the judicial function." The language used by the courts implies a
constitutional limitation on the ability of courts to make even consensual references. This concept of constitutional restrictions confficts
with long-standing approval in several areas of the law of federal court
enforcement of decisions by non-Article III federal tribunals when the
parties had consented to the tribunal.
Arbitration has long been recognized as a means of "private" dispute settlement that removes disputes from the district courts.52 A
contractual agreement to submit disputes to arbitration determines the
scope of authority of the arbitrator in the same way that Kimberly allowed the order of reference to define the master's authority. 3 The
primary distinction between arbitration and consensual reference to a
magistrate is that an arbitration award can be reversed only on very
limited grounds,54 such as evident bias on the part of the arbitrator, 55
admiralty commissioner on the ground that it "would be to impose upon a group of
litigants against their will the expense and delay of unnecessary reference." Id. at 397.

Both Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942),
and United States v. Kirkpatrick, supra, involved reference over the objection of one of
the parties, but only Kirpatrick made any special mention of this fact.
50 352 U.S. 249 (1957). This opinion has been only slightly mitigated by a few
subsequent circuit court decisions approving use of masters in limited pre-trial settings.
See Wilver v. Fischer, 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Central Transformer Corp., 808 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1962); Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (8th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
51 See text and notes at notes 1-7 supra.
52 See Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut Corp., 867 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1966); Burchell v.
Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854). See generally W. STuRGES, ComcircRA ARBITRATIONS AND
AwARas (1930).
53 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); Marceron v. Chevy Chase Servs., Inc., 258 F.2d 155 (D.C.

Cir. 1958); Wright Lumber Co. v. Herron, 199 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1952).
54 Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an award may be vacated only when procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means; where the arbitrators were obviously prejudiced;
where the arbitrators engaged in misconduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties; or
where the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers so that a proper
award was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
55 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968);
American Guarantee Trust v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934).
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the entry of an award that is in manifest disregard of the law or which
compels disobedience to a law or an established public policy,56 or
57
evidence that the arbitrator went beyond the scope of his authority.
Arbitrators need not adhere to court procedure,58 the rules of evidence, 59 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ° nor need they
render any opinion explaining their decision. 61 A factor distinguishing
arbitration from district court and magistrates' proceedings, although
not from masters' proceedings, is that arbitrators must be compensated
by the parties-a factor that often makes arbitration a very costly
undertaking. It has often been held that public policy favors reference
to arbitration; 2 if this is so, it is difficult to understand how reference
to a magistrate can be considered, in all cases, "an abdication of the
decision making authority."
Deprecation of the magistrate in civil cases is also inconsistent with
their extensive use in criminal cases. Although Felix Frankfurter
argued that trial by magistrate of petty offenses was constitutional regardless of consent, 63 in the Federal Magistrates Act Congress required
that the defendant consent to trial by magistrate.64 The petty offense
jurisdiction was justified in the legislative debates on several grounds.
Among these was tradition;6 the law has always recognized the pro56 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); San Martine Compania De Navegadon, S.A.
v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
57 See J.P. Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros. Const. Co., 374 F.2d 324
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1967); Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v.
Eastern States Petroleum Corp. of Panama, S.A., 312 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 949 (1963).
58 See Compania Panemena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co.,
244 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1957); American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales
Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944).
59 See Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Ref. Corp., 296 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1961).
60 See Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
61 See Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); Hale v. Friedman, 281 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
But see Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 338 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (arbitrator must
give sufficient reasons to show that decision was within statute controlling arbitration
decision).
62 See Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut Corp., 367 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1966); Metro Indus.
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 817 (1961); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1961).
63 Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guarantee of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926). See also Doub & Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. Ray. 443
(1959).
04 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970), by incorporating the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970),
requires the consent of the defendant.
65 See Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 276.
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priety of trying petty offenses to a magistrate, preserving appeal to an
Article III tribunal. A more persuasive argument was based on
Congress's Article I power to create tribunals for certain cases over
which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction. 6 This
power has been used, for example, to require state courts to try certain
federal penal offenses. 67 Consensual reference of civil or criminal cases
to a federal magistrate is less a denial of Article III protections than is
a mandatory relegation of cases to state courts. While the federal
magistrate, unlike the state court, is exercising the "judicial power" of
the United States, any requirement that the magistrate himself be an
Article III judge would be gratuitous in light of the consent given by
the parties. The right to trial in the district court is preserved; the
parties are simply given the option of appearing before a different
tribunal. If this justification supports use of magistrates in criminal
cases, then a fortiori it must support their use in civil cases.
IV
A system of consensual reference to federal magistrates is constitutionally permissible and finds support in early master doctrine. Three
questions remain, however, with regard to the desirability and feasibility of wide use of federal magistrates to reduce the district court
civil case load. First, would widespread reference result in judicial
economies? Second, is consensual reference authorized by the present
Magistrates Act or is new legislation necessary? Third, assuming that
consensual references are both permissible and practically desirable,
what inducements can or should be offered to encourage consent?
A. Judicial Economy
Cases such as TPO6S and La Buy 9 argued that decision by the
district judge "could dispose of the litigation with greater dispatch and
less effort than anyone else." 70 This was true on the facts of those cases,
since the action in each case had been split into two parts: facts were
tried before the magistrate and law before the court. A reference of the
entire case would, however, allow all the economies of the use of one
informed tribunal. Use of a system of consensual reference would pro6 See id. at 246-55.
67 See Testa v. Katt, 330 US. 386 (1947); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 255-56.

See generally Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal
Statutes: Developments in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1947); cf. Blackmon
v. Lee, 12 F.R.D. 411 (D.D.C. 1952).
68 TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
69 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
70 Id. at 256.
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duce three sorts of benefits. To the extent that the less difficult cases are
channelled to the magistrate, district judges will be freed to deal more
effectively with the more difficult and important cases. Second, if the
magistrates' dockets are kept uncongested, the parties, and society as
a whole, will receive the benefits of rapid adjudication and more
careful consideration of cases by both tribunals.71 Third, a magistrate
may be hired for one term only, eliminating presently existing congestion without the need to engage tenured judges who may be unnecessary after the congestion has been relieved.
Two caveats are in order with regard to the possible economies of a
system of consensual reference. First, a reduction in direct outlays for
litigation or in the costs occasioned by delay will reduce the costs of
some aspects of litigation without reducing the stakes in the suit. The
parties will respond to this decrease by spending more on other aspects
of litigation, such as discovery, and it is impossible to determine
a priori whether there will be a net reduction in the total cost of legal
dispute resolution.72 Second, an increase in the speed with which matters go to trial will increase the effective stakes in the controversy,
because the time during which no interest accrues on the alleged
damages is decreased. Other things being equal, an increase in the
stakes will reduce the incentive to settle the controversy before trial and
more cases will proceed to trial. This will in turn increase the demand
for magistrates and offset part or all of the initial reduction in con73
gestion.
Assuming that the use of magistrates will create trial economies,
there remains the possibility that magistrates' decisions will be appealed
more often, offsetting the gains. But this is unlikely. Only a small
percentage of the cases decided in district courts are appealed.7 4 Insofar as the magistrate's decision is reviewed on the same standard as is
71 The magistrates would begin with a completely empty docket. If trial by magistrate
was considered the precise equivalent of trial by the district court and consent was
induced solely by speed, the demand for trial by magistrate would soon equalize the
congestion in district and magistrate courts. In reality, however, parties can be expected
to perceive magistrate courts as inferior, either in training or merely in symbolic value.
The absolute demand for magistrates will therefore be less than for district courts. This
smaller demand will be offset by the advantages of speed at a point somewhere between
no delay and the district court congestion. One additional means of insuring uncongested
magistrates courts would be for the district judges to be selective in the cases they approved for referral.
72 See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LPGAL STUDIEs 399 (1973); cf. Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1965);
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. IAw & EcoN. 61 (1971).
73 See sources cited note 72 supra.
74 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OrriE OF THE UNITED
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101-03, 119 (1971).
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presently applied to district court decisions, and assuming that costs
of appeal are similar and reversal no more likely, a similar percentage
of appeals will be taken from magistrates' decisions. This would result
in a load reduction to the district courts similar to that presently
provided to the courts of appeal by the district courts. Nor is it necessary that cases tried before a magistrate be appealable to both the
district court and the circuit court of appeals. Appeals from certain
non-Article III tribunals are presently taken directly to the circuit
courts.7 5 Article III leaves to Congress complete discretion over the
jurisdiction of the lower courts and the routing of appeals among them,
so that appeals from magistrates' decision might also be limited to the
district courts with no review in the circuit courts.
B.

Legality under the Act
The Magistrates Act permits any references "not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States,"76 thereby allowing
reference whenever the parties consent. The subcommittee memorandum that accompanied the Act stated:
Since full-time magistrates under the new system are supposed to
spend all their time on their official duties, it is appropriate to
allow the district court to make whatever use of their services as
it sees fit, in addition to the functions that the statute assigns
them ....
The use of magistrates for duties that do not require
the employment of an Article III judge, or in cases in which the
partiesconsent to the use of a magistrate,may do much to increase
77
the efficiency of the Federal courts.
During congressional consideration of the Act, the suggestion that
magistrates might perform a wide range of duties received favorable
comment.7 8 The question of consent as a basis for granting adjudicatory
powers in civil cases was largely ignored, but when it did arise it was
also commented upon favorably.7 9 Thus, if the parties consent, it seems
75 E.g., appeals from NLRB enforcement orders taken under § 10(f) of the L.M.R.A.,
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), and appeals from decisions of the Environmental Protection
Agency under § 307(b)(1) of the AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AcT, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(5)(b)(1)

(1970).
76 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
77 Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 14 (emphasis added).
78 E.g., id. at 234; House Hearings,supra note 7, at 73. These comments often referred
to the pre-trial duties of magistrates, a focus that is probably attributable to the virtual
disregard of the possibility of consensual reference in civil cases rather than to any
intent to limit the powers of magistrates.
79 "I believe that lawyers in New York City (the area with which I am most familiar)
would consent to trials before United States magistrates in a fair number of civil cases.
.. The result of permitting magistrates to try civil cases would probably be a substantial
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clear that the Magistrates Act authorizes reference in all cases according
to rules set out by the district courts.
C.

Incentives to Reference
The major advantage of a reference would be the speed with which a
case would be considered and a decision rendered.80 When both parties
desire a speedy resolution, there would be no problems in obtaining
consent. Plaintiffs often desire speed to reduce attorney's costs, to avoid
deterioration of the evidence, and to minimize the losses resulting from
interest being paid only from the date of the judgment. But the defendant may often prefer delay, since each of these factors weakens the
plaintiff's case and decreases the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand. It is, therefore, necessary to devise inducements to encourage the
defendant to consent to a magistrate.8 '
First, it may be possible to remove some of the existing incentives
for delay. For example, interest on a claim is, at present, calculated only
from the time of the judgment, making it a reasonable economic precaution for the defendant to delay as long as possible. This incentive
could be eliminated by awarding interest from the day of filing.8 2
Second, incentives to use reference to magistrates could be created
through a system of filing fees. Adjudication of claims by the federal
courts is at present substantially subsidized by the federal government,
because filing fees cover only a small portion of court costs. Such a subsidy of civil claims is justifiable only insofar as the adjudication of
claims between parties serves to generate rules beneficial to society in
general. A requirement that parties using the comparatively more expensive district court system bear part of the differential cost would be
justifiable if district court decisions retained their quality despite
diversion of cases to magistrates where magistrates' decisions are not
treated as precedent or if magistrates decisions are treated as precedent
but regarded as not significantly less valuable than district court decisions. Lower costs would be assessed to the parties using the less expensive magistrate system. A flat filing fee differential would, in all
likelihood, force some smaller claims into magistrate courts. Assuming
that parties' preference for district courts is based on a belief in a higher
lightening of the docket, an important consideration in view of current concern with the
volume of work in the federal courts." Senate Hearings,supra note 3,at 235 (remarks of
Mr. Irving Younger).
80 See note 73 supra.
81 See sources cited at note 74 supra.
82 In addition, if the interest rate used by the court was slightly higher than the
market rate, there would be a positive inducement to the defendant for speed and thus
to reference.
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quality of legal, rather than factual, decisions, a flat filing fee differential would also induce cases involving easily resolved legal questions,
and thus of low precedential importance, into the magistrate's courts8 3
A third incentive to reference can be produced by the appointment
of masters skilled in particular nonlegal areas. For example, parties to
a patent case involving complex scientific questions of fact but relatively
straightforward questions of law are very likely to prefer a scientifically
trained and legally competent magistrate to a legally superior but
scientifically incompetent district judge. As the legal issues in such a
case increase relative to the scientific issues, the incentive to reference
will decrease, thus selecting the cases of lesser precedential value for
reference.
Since the need to offer inducements arises because speed has a positive value to plaintiffs and a negative value to defendants, it is possible
to induce defendants to consent to reference by allowing plaintiffs to
"pay" to defendants some of the value conferred upon plaintiffs by the
increase in speed. While there might be objections to a plan proposing
direct cash payments to "purchase" consent, the same effect can be
achieved through other means. One device would be to allow plaintiff
and defendant to agree, in the consent to reference, on a maximum
damage award. This would directly confer value on the defendant by
reducing the stakes that the defendant stands to lose; since the maximum could be set at any sum, the defendant could be "paid" any price
agreed on through the device. This "purchase" of consent would occur
whenever the plaintiff's perceived benefits from speed are greater than
defendant's perceived benefits from delay, and the gap between plaintiff's minimum settlement demand and defendant's maximum settlement offer is greater than the "price" plaintiff pays to obtain reference.
Speed, interest from the date of claim, filing fee differentials, and
"purchase" of consent are all means of inducing consent. Insofar as the
effects of widespread use of consensual reference will not be fully clear
until after the system has been tested, those inducements that involve
least change in the present system are likely to meet with least resistance
in the legal community. It is suggested, therefore, that a system of consensual reference be attempted first with speed and "purchase" as the
only inducements; interest from the date of claim might be added after
the system has been tested or as part of a general reform of rules on
interest. Differential filing fees, however, should not be employed until
after the system of consensual reference has proven itself.
83 The problem of possible discrimination against indigents could be dealt with by
a fee waiver method similar to that presently in use.
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CONCLUSION

Recent cases concerning federal magistrates have strongly disapproved any exercise by the magistrates of civil adjudicative powers.
This disapproval is closely linked with the rules developed to prevent
abuses of the earlier system of special masters. These recent cases, however, ignore the element of consent to reference as a validating factor.
In early decisions on masters, it was recognized that entire cases could
be referred to masters for decision if the parties consented. This practice in no way conflicts with Article III of the Constitution. Insofar as
the Magistrates Act removes many of the problems that made reference
to a master undesirable, a return to a system of consensual reference
could provide a means of reducing the work load of and congestion in
the district courts. Under such a system, those parties using the federal
forum merely as a springboard to settlement or for resolution of relatively simple problems could be induced to consent to a reference,
leaving the district courts free to deal with the more difficult and precedent setting cases.
William H. Block

